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Moral behavior and concern for others are sometimes argued to set humans apart 
from other species. However, there is some evidence that humans are not the only animal 
species to possess these characteristics. Work from behavioral biology and neuroscience 
has indicated that some of these traits are present in other species, including other 
primates. Studying these behaviors in other species can inform us about the evolutionary 
trajectory of morality, either helping understand how the behaviors evolved and which 
environmental characteristics were critical for their emergence. While this evolutionary 
approach to human behavior is not always well received, a brief historical look indicates 
that this has not always been the case. For instance Adam Smith, better known for his 
economics than his natural history, was clearly sympathetic with the view that moral 
behaviors are present in species other than humans.  This paper focuses on how 
individuals respond to inequity, which is related to moral behavior.  Recent evidence 
shows that nonhuman primates distinguish between inequitable and equitable outcomes.  
However, this is primarily in situations in which inequity hurts the self (e.g. 
disadvantageous inequity) rather than another (e.g. advantageous inequity). Studying 
such responses can help us understand the evolutionary basis of moral behavior, which 
increases our understanding of how our own morality emerged. 
 
Keywords:  Capuchin monkey, chimpanzee, inequity, inequality, moral behavior, 
evolution of behavior 
Classification Codes: DO3 
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1.2  Introduction 
  Do moral behaviors mark humans as unique? While our system of morality 
presents as much more highly developed and extensive than other species’, it is not 
without precedent. A close look at individual moral behaviors indicates that, in many 
cases, antecedent or related behaviors and mechanisms can be found in other species, 
including conflict resolution, reciprocity, empathy, sympathy, and community concern 
(Flack & de Waal, 2000). While this doesn’t mean that a fully human moral system is 
present in any other species, studying other species can teach us something about the 
evolution of these behaviors. 
Studying moral behaviors in other species has several benefits.  First, these 
behaviors give scientists the opportunity to determine how and under what conditions our 
own moral behaviors might have evolved.  In the comparative approach, behaviors from 
different species with known phylogenetic relationships are compared.  By linking the 
observed behavior to the known relationships, a picture of the evolution of the behavior 
emerges.  If two closely related species share a behavior, this is likely the result of a 
common ancestor which had the behavior, termed homology1.  On the other hand, if two 
                                                 
1 It is important to note that there are two evolutionary mechanisms which could have led to similar moral 
behaviors in humans and other species.  First is homology, in which behaviors are shared by two species 
through common descent.  In other words, the behavior existed in an ancestor of the two species and has 
remained in both species.  The second mechanism is convergence, in which behaviors emerged in two 
species independently because similar environmental pressures led to situations favorable for the 
maintenance of these behaviors when they emerged through chance evolutionary processes.  To give an 
example, robins and eagles share wings through homology; their most recent shared ancestor had wings, 
and they both still have wings.  On the other hand, robins, butterflies, and vampire bats share wings through 
convergence; all three species (or their ancestors) were in an environment in which wings provided a 
benefit, so when the appropriate genetic variation arose through chance (e.g. mutation, recombination), 
individuals with wings were favored by natural selection. These species have no common ancestor which 
had wings.  Studying only one or a few species, it is difficult to determine which process led to similarities.  
However either way, the comparative approach can be useful in determining what environmental pressures 
led to the emergence of the behavior and which evolutionary trajectory it took upon the behaviors’ 
emergence. 
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species which are distantly related, but inhabit similar environmental niches, share a 
behavior, it is likely the result of convergence due to shared environmental constraints (of 
course, convergence may also occur between closely related species; see Brosnan, 
Newton-Fisher, and van Vugt, 2009).  Care must be taken when making these 
assessments, but this approach allows for a determination of which behaviors existed in a 
common ancestor and which environmental or social factors may have been critical to the 
emergence of the behavior(s) (Boehm, 1999). Having this information may help to 
understand situations in which humans do or do not appear to deploy moral behavior.  Of 
course, it is also worth studying these behaviors in other species on their own merit. 
Second, studying other species may also allow investigation of questions which 
are more difficult in humans.  Of course, problems arise in studying both humans and 
nonhumans in laboratories (Boesch, 2007), and field studies have their own set of issues 
(Burnham and Kurzban, 2005).  Unique to humans, experimental factors such as 
anonymity and interaction with strangers are controversial (Fessler, 2009; Trivers, 2006), 
and social and environmental context can alter people’s contributions in economic games 
(Hagan and Hammerstein, 2006).  Studying captive animals avoids some of these issues, 
as interactions are occurring between individuals with very well known social histories 
(typically spanning the individuals’ entire lifespans), allowing for more detailed 
investigations of the effects of relationships and social environment (Brosnan et al., 
2009b). 
 This paper will address the evolution of one moral behavior, the sense of justice, 
from a biological perspective, using empirical data on how non-humans respond to 
inequitable and unequal outcomes.  The goals of this paper are three-fold.  First is to 
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make the point that Adam Smith, despite the age in which he lived and his area of study, 
appeared to accept the continuity of species, including humans, an understanding which 
is sadly not as common as it ought to be today.  Second is to propose that the nonhuman 
literature may be able to inform the human literature, specifically with regards to how 
context may affect perceptions of inequity.  The final goal is to make the case that an 
evolutionary approach to economics is useful and worth engaging.   
1.3  Smith, Darwin, and Moral Emotions 
 Not surprisingly, Charles Darwin was a strong proponent of the idea that humans 
and animals shared an evolutionary history. Although his most famous book, The Origin 
of Species (Darwin, 1964 [1859]), regarded primarily non-human species, two of his 
following books explicitly addressed humans, and the role of evolutionary processes in 
shaping humans, including their behavior. In The Descent of Man and Selection in 
Relation to Sex (Darwin, 1981 [1871]), Darwin argues that the basis of morality is innate, 
rather than created de novo by humankind and provides a framework for the development 
of moral systems in any culture, group, or species.  
The following proposition seems to me in a high degree probable – namely that 
any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts, the parental and 
filial affections being here included, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or 
conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers became as well developed, or nearly 
as well developed, as in man. For firstly, the social instincts lead an animal to take 
pleasure in the society of its fellows, to feel a certain amount of sympathy for 
them, and to perform various services for them. (pp. 71-2). 
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He goes on to argue that other animals feel at least some level of sympathy for one 
another. Although Darwin does believe that moral behavior requires fairly advanced 
intellectual ability, the primary feature he highlights as a necessity is “well-marked social 
instincts,” among which he included interactions with family. This encompasses a wide 
variety of animal species.  
In The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (Darwin, 1998 [1872]), 
Darwin made the case that moral emotions, like other traits, were the result of 
evolutionary continuity between humans and other animals.  For this, Darwin relied on 
comparative data regarding facial expressions across both human cultures and different 
species, and addresses the reasons why these universal expressions take the form that 
they do.   
 Although he is better known for his ideas in economics than his evolutionary 
stance, Adam Smith appears to support this as well. While Smith does focus on human 
distinctions in his best known book, The Wealth of Nations (for instance asserting that 
only humans have developed barter and trade; Smith, 2000 [1776]), his approach is 
somewhat different in other writings spanning this publication. Smith’s earlier work, The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith, 1817 [1759]) also focuses on human typical 
behaviors, however he appears open to – or even endorses – the idea of evolutionary 
continuity. In his discussion of ‘The Passions which take their origin from the Body’ 
(Part I, Section II, Chapter I), Smith explicitly argues against the ancient philosopher’s 
conception that only our ‘brutish’ passions are shared with the animals, taking the 
position that both positive and negative passions are seen in common – in other words, 
that animals share many traits we consider human: 
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Such is our aversion for all the appetites which take their origin from the 
body: all strong expressions of them are loathsome and disagreeable. 
According to some ancient philosophers, these are the passions which we 
share in common with the brutes, and which having no connexion with the 
characteristical qualities of human nature, are upon that account beneath 
its dignity. But there are many other passions which we share in common 
with the brutes, such as resentment, natural affection, even gratitude, 
which do not, upon that account, appear to be so brutal. (Smith, 1817 
[1759]), p 30).  
This idea that only negative passions are shared between humans and other species has 
not yet fully disappeared (de Waal, 1996).  
 Smith also uses comparisons between animals and humans to support his 
arguments about the nature of humanity. In TMS, he makes the point that all animals, 
including children, dogs, and ‘cholerick man’ are likely to become angry at inanimate 
objects which hurt us (Part II, Section III, Chapter I). In his posthumously published 
Essays on Philosophical Subjects (Smith, 1982 [1795]), in the chapter on the external 
senses, Smith argues for the innateness of some human senses, particularly vision, from 
analogy with other animals. Smith’s discussion of the characteristics of the senses of 
other species additionally shows that he is informed about the Linnaean rank system for 
classifying organisms, and natural history in general. 
 Finally, for his time Smith had an advanced biological understanding of how 
human behavior functioned.  Smith argued that human instincts were in place to promote 
survival and reproduction, an explicitly biological understanding of human behavior 
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which preceded Darwin (Wight, 2009).  He further believed that these instincts were 
initially experienced as emotion, rather than rational thought, and often served 
unconscious ends.  Today we might refer to these motivations as ‘proximate causes2’ 
which explain how the behavior functions in the animal.  Note that these motivations do 
not assume any understanding on the part of the animal.  Although he does not explicitly 
refer to non-human species, this placement of human behavior firmly in the realm of the 
biological embeds humans in the natural world.  
 Hence, the idea of evolutionary continuity of behavior, even in realms often 
reserved for humans, such as the moral emotions, is not new. It was endorsed explicitly 
by both Smith and Darwin, then more or less disappeared in the last century, possibly due 
to the rise of foci on learning (behaviorism in psychology) and culture (in anthropology; 
Ekman, 1998). It seems likely that Smith and Darwin would have predominantly agreed 
with each other’s viewpoints, and in returning to their more inclusive approach, we may 
improve our understanding of human behavior. 
1.4  Moral emotions and moral behaviors in nonhumans 
 Moral emotions have been described as those emotions which focus on others, 
rather than the self, are elicited by stimuli which do not affect the self (e.g. inequality 
eliciting sympathy), and result in an outcome which helps others or society (Haidt, 2003).  
In other words, these emotions are among the proximate mechanisms which are 
necessary to uphold the rules of behavior underlying social norms and conventions.  
Moral emotions encompass different classes of emotions.  For instance, they include both 
                                                 
2 Evolutionary biologists distinguish between proximate mechanisms and ultimate causes.  Proximate 
mechanisms explain how the behavior functions within an individual while ultimate causes explain how the 
behavior evolved over the species’ history.  For instance, the ultimate cause of eating is that it provides the 
energy and nutrients required for survival, but the proximate mechanism which leads individuals to 
consume food is the pleasure of doing so, not an understanding of its necessity. 
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positive emotions, such as elevation, gratitude, or pride, and negative emotions, such as 
shame, guilt, and embarrassment (Tangney et al., 2007), as well as including both 
prosocial emotions, or those which improve the outcomes of other members of one’s 
group and antisocial emotions, which may decrease the fitness of other group members.  
Despite seeming contrary to morality, these latter emotions are moral if they change the 
recipient’s behavior to be more in line with the groups’ norms. While it is difficult to 
study emotions in non-verbal species, many scientists include other animals when 
discussing moral behaviors or moral emotions (Bonnie and de Waal, 2004; Flack and de 
Waal, 2000; Haidt, 2003).  One such behavior for which there is a relatively extensive 
literature is responses to inequitable outcomes.   
1.4.1  Justice, equity, and equality 
Adam Smith refers to justice as “the main pillar that upholds the whole edifice [of 
human society]” (1817 [1759]; p 115). Two related components of justice are equity and 
equality.  Equality assumes identical outcomes, but fails to account for effort and 
deservedness.  Equity does so. Since perception varies, an equal reward may be 
inequitable, or an equitable reward may be unequal.  Because of this, this paper relies 
primarily on the concept of equity rather than equality. Although justice is difficult to 
study in non-verbal species, equity can be operationalized, allowing for an experimental 
approach.  
In the fields of economics and psychology, equity is considered to consist of two 
components, one’s reactions to one’s own outcomes, and one’s reaction to others’ 
outcomes (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Walster [Hatfield] et al., 1978). The former, 
disadvantageous inequity, is probably the most common, and is fairly easy to explain 
Evolution of Moral Emotions  page 10 
 
 
from an evolutionary perspective (Brosnan, 2006a, b).  Individuals who notice that they 
receive less than another and change their behavior in ways that rectifies the inequity 
directly improve their outcomes, so this behavior is under strong positive selection.   
However, this is entirely about one’s own outcomes. In order to qualify as a moral 
behavior, individuals must also notice and react when others are treated less well.  These 
advantageous inequity responses are critical to a full-fledged moral system, yet it seems 
on the surface to be difficult to explain via natural selection.  However, several good 
hypotheses exist to explain the evolution of the response.  First, advantageous inequity 
responses also benefit the self, as a commitment device which demonstrates to others the 
actor’s dedication to equity and general merit as a social partner (e.g. Frank, 1988, 2001).  
Humans’ behavior supports this in some experimental settings, as people will make 
decisions which lower their absolute and relative outcomes, presumably to send a signal 
to their partner (Yamagishi et al., 2009).  Related to this, responding to rectify inequity 
which is detrimental to another may also improve one’s own reputation, providing 
benefits in the future (Milinski et al., 2002; Nowak, 1998; Wenekind, 2000).  Both of 
these functional explanations make clear why this prosocial behavior was selected, but 
more immediate proximate factors may be empathy and the ‘warm glow’ people get from 
helping others (Andreoni, 1989; Batson, 1991; Zak, present volume).  It has been 
speculated that other primates, too, experience this (de Waal et al., 2008).  Smith 
mentions this phenomenon in his own writing as well: “But whatever may be the cause of 
sympathy, or however it may be excited, nothing pleases us more than to observe in other 
men a fellow-feeling with all the emotions of our own breast” (Smith, 1817 [1759]), p. 
13).  Although advantageous inequity responses are ostensibly about benefiting others, 
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because of the personal benefits (even in the case of the warm glow; Andreoni, 1989) it 
nonetheless has benefits for the self. 
In the literature discussing justice or inequity in nonhumans, it is fairly common 
to treat these two components separately, with the latter typically being pursued as ‘other-
regarding’ or empathetic behavior.  This discussion is beyond the scope of the paper, 
however the empirical evidence will be presented as it is relevant to question.   
1.4.2  Equity and equality in nonhumans 
Several species respond negatively when they are treated less well than a social 
partner (Brosnan, 2006a, b, in press-a, b).  Chimpanzees, capuchin monkeys, dogs, 
rabbits, and, to some extent, tamarins, all show responses which indicate frustration or 
distress, such as refusing food rewards or refusing to participate in interactions, when 
social partners receive better outcomes for completing a task (Brosnan and de Waal, 
2003; Brosnan et al., 2005; Fletcher, 2008; Heidary et al., 2008; Neiworth et al, 2009; 
Range et al., 2008;  van Wolkenten et al., 2007). This response is similar to that seen in 
humans when playing the impunity game (Yamagishi et al., 2009). This reaction is not 
surprising, as it is an extension of violation of expectation, which has been known in 
primates for almost 100 years (Tinklepaugh, 1928), and interacts with inequity (Brosnan 
et al, 2010). However the inequity response is based on an expectation set up by what 
someone else received, or a social expectation, rather than an individual expectation.   
 The reaction varies dependent upon the context. For instance, the response has 
thus far only been elicited in the context of a task to receive the reward, such as an 
exchange, which may indicate the importance of interaction or cooperation in 
determining whether outcomes are inequitable (Brosnan, 2008-a; see section 1.4.3 below 
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for more details).  Among chimpanzees, individuals’ responses also differ depending on 
their social environment (Brosnan et al., 2005), perhaps based upon social relationships, 
as in humans (Clark and Grote, 2003).  One study has found a sex difference in response, 
with males responding to social expectation and female to individual expectation 
(Brosnan et al, 2010).  Finally, rank appears to make a difference in some situations, with 
dominant individuals responding more strongly than subordinates (Brosnan et al, 2010, 
Bräuer et al, 2009). 
While primates respond strongly to inequitable outcomes, or distributional 
inequity, procedural inequity does not elicit a response.  No study has found evidence of 
a negative response to effort differences, such as when only one individual must complete 
a task, or when one individual must complete a more difficult task, to get the reward 
(Fontenot et al., 2007; Roma et al., 2006; van Wolkenten et al., 2007; Brosnan et al, 
2010).  Moreover, other sorts of procedural differences do not affect responses; a time 
delay inserted between the task and the reward for only one individual does not affect 
subjects’ reactions (Brosnan et al, 2010).   
Finally, data from a more naturalistic study indicate that the long-term behavior of 
the partner is more important than the outcome of individual interactions.  In an 
experimental cooperation task, subjects were much more likely to cooperate if they and 
their partner evenly shared the better rewards. For this task, capuchin monkeys had to 
work together to pull in a heavy tray which contained food for each of them. However, 
the foods were not always the same, and the monkeys had to decide whether they were 
willing to work for the food reward in front of them. Since they were not separated from 
each other, this was determined by the monkeys, rather than by the human experimenter. 
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Subjects were willing to work for lower-value rewards as long as they got about half of 
the higher value rewards across all of the trials. Pairs in which the partners shared the 
better rewards about half of the time were highly successful in this cooperative task, 
while pairs in which one partner excluded the other from receiving the higher value 
rewards rarely achieved cooperation. Hence, although the dominants in the second case 
(non-sharing dominants) received more higher-value items than their partners, they 
received many fewer rewards overall than sharing dominants because of the lower 
success rate. (There was a condition in which both monkeys got high-value rewards, so 
this difference cannot be explained by an overall lack of motivation.) Thus, subordinates 
seemed to expect that working together on a task should lead to relative equity of reward 
outcome (Brosnan et al., 2006), and dominant partners who failed to do this received a 
form of punishment.  The conclusion is that a critical factor in a naturalistic cooperative 
task is whether the partner’s behavior is equitable, rather than whether the actual rewards 
on any given trial are so. 
 In the majority of these studies of inequity, there was little evidence that the 
advantaged partner was attempting to reconcile the discrepancy between the rewards 
(Brosnan, 2006a; although see Brosnan et al, 2010 and below for counter-evidence in one 
group of chimpanzees). However, these experiments were not designed to measure 
advantageous inequity; food rewards were not easily divisible, requiring individuals to 
share all or nothing on an individual trial (a high cost).  Moreover, only in the Brosnan et 
al, 2006 study was there any benefit to the individual for sharing.  However, other studies 
have been done which were designed to minimize the cost to individuals for creating 
equality between themselves and a partner. 
Evolution of Moral Emotions  page 14 
 
 
 In most of these experiments, one primate is given a choice between an option 
which brings food both to itself and to a partner and an option which brings food only to 
itself (Silk et al., 2005). To make the task as simple as possible, the subjects’ food 
rewards do not differ between the conditions, so self-interested motivation should not 
have differed. Subjects are typically tested in two different conditions, one in which they 
were paired with a social partner and one in which they were alone, as a response 
grounded in equity concerns must lead to an increase in sharing when a partner is present 
more than when the partner is absent. This differentiation helps control for the possibility 
that subjects’ interest in the equal option is because it is a larger amount of food (even 
though they do not get it all).  
 Chimpanzees have been tested on this paradigm by two research teams at three 
different facilities.  In each case, no subject behaved differently from chance, bringing 
food to their partners about half of the time (Jensen et al., 2006; Silk et al., 2005).  This 
remained true in a follow-up test in which the subjects could reward themselves and then 
their partners (Vonk et al., 2008). Even when the experiment was altered so that sharing 
was explicitly self-benefiting – by adding reciprocity within the session – chimpanzees 
were indifferent between the options (Brosnan et al., 2009a). However, chimpanzees do 
help others by completing simple tasks (fetching a pen, removing a blockade; Warneken 
et al., 2006; Warneken et al., 2007).  Finally, as mentioned above, in one study 
chimpanzees did refuse a grape as a reward more often when their partner got a cucumber 
(a less valuable reward) than when their partner also got a grape, although this may not 
have been due to prosocial motivations (Brosnan et al, 2010). 
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Several hypotheses have emerged to explain this apparent discrepancy within 
chimpanzee behavior, although none satisfactorily explain all of the data.  The first 
hypothesis is that food, as a limited resource, leads to the perception of a zero-sum game 
rather than an opportunity to share.  Thus, the chimpanzee’s goal in these experiments 
may be to avoid giving food to the competitor (Warneken et al., 2007). A second 
hypothesis is that explicit requests are required to generate prosocial behavior in 
chimpanzees (Yamamoto and Tanaka, 2009), although this does not explain the behavior 
in other studies (Cronin et al., 2009; Sillk et al, 2005).  More recently, marmosets, a new 
world monkey species, were found to show prosocial behavior (Burkart et al., 2007) in a 
situation very similar to that of Silk et al (2005).  The authors proposed that cooperative 
breeders have evolved to show more prosocial behaviors, due to selection for extensive 
prosocial interactions among non-kin.  However, another recent study found that 
marmosets, which are very closely related to tamarins, do not show prosocial behavior in 
a similar paradigm (Cronin et al, 2009; although see also Cronin & Snowdon, 2008, for 
evidence of reciprocal behavior in tamarins).  Moreover, capuchin monkeys, a non-
cooperatively breeding new world monkey, albeit one with allomaternal care, do show 
prosocial behavior (de Waal et al., 2008; Lakshminarayanan and Santos, 2008; Takimoto 
et al, 2010), as do dominant long-tailed macaques (Massen et al, 2010).  These results 
have led some to reject the cooperative breeding hypothesis as neither necessary nor 
sufficient (Lakshminarayanan and Santos, 2008). 
1.4.3  The context of inequity 
 Humans respond differently to inequity depending upon the source.  In 
experimental games, for instance, humans change their pattern of responses if there 
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appears to be a reason for inequity.  Subjects offer less and partners accept this inequity 
more readily if the subject is perceived to have earned the right to it (e.g. by performing 
well on a test; Hoffman et al., 1994; List and Cherry, 2008).  Humans also respond more 
strongly to inequity which is caused by another human directly than to inequity resulting 
from chance (e.g. a computer-generated response; Blount, 1995; Knoch et al., 2006).  
Despite these few studies, little research has been done on how the framing of the 
inequitable outcome affects perception.  This may be particularly important since most 
payoffs in experimental economics occur in the context of ‘free’ money which the 
subjects receive when they walk through the door (Wight, 2009). 
Non-human primates respond very differently to inequity which results following 
a task than to that which is due to ‘free’ handouts.  This evidence emerges from the 
consistent finding that most primates respond to inequity only when the payoffs are 
framed as a ‘payment’ for completing a task, but not when rewards are framed as a ‘gift’ 
which is handed to participants for free. In these studies, subjects typically either earn 
rewards by exchanging a token with a human experimenter (for which they receive a food 
item in payment) or are simply handed food rewards by the experimenter, with no task.   
No apes appear to show a response to inequity without a task (Bräuer et al., 2006; 
Brosnan et al, 2010).  When a task is included, results are variable; bonobos do respond, 
orangutans do not, and chimpanzees’ responses vary both between and within studies 
(Bräuer et al., 2009; Brosnan et al, 2005; Brosnan et al, 2010; Brosnan et al, in prep).  
Thus, it is probable that there are other ecological, experimental, or social factors which 
are affecting the response (Brosnan et al, 2010).   Among monkeys, tamarins do not show 
an inequity response when there is no task present, but increase their refusal rates over 
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time when a task is present (Neiworth et al, 2009).  Among capuchins, the same pattern 
holds (Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; Fletcher, 2008; van Wolkenten et al, 2007; Dindo & de 
Waal, 2006; Dubreuil, Gentile, & Visalberghi, 2006; Fontenot et al, 2007; Roma et al, 
2006), with subjects in the exceptional study showing no response to a contrast effect, 
either, indicating that there may have been another reason that the subjects didn’t respond 
(Silberberg et al, 2009).  Notably three of these studies used the same group of capuchin 
subjects, and the one which did not use a task (Dindo and de Waal, 2006) found no 
response to inequity while those which did use a task (Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; van 
Wolkenten et al, 2007) found that monkeys did respond when receiving less good food 
rewards than their partners. Although all of the abovementioned examples are only 
correlational evidence, a recent study including both conditions counterbalanced within 
the same experiment has supported this in chimpanzees (Brosnan et al, 2010). Thus, 
something about the task seems to be critical in triggering expectation.  
There are several hypotheses for this behavior (Brosnan et al, 2010).  First, this 
could be due to the typical captive environment, in which food is routinely handed to 
subjects by humans.  They may have become accustomed to inequity in this context.  
However, another possibility is that subjects react to inequity only in situations which 
require some sort of effort. There seems to be a fundamental difference in the way 
inequity is perceived between situations in which the rewards are unearned (received for 
‘free’) and those in which rewards result from an effortful task.  It may be that joint 
efforts require joint payoffs (van Wolkenten et al, 2007), thus animals may not expect 
equity in situation in which there is no perception of working with another. This is 
reminiscent of humans accepting more unequal rewards when they believe a computer 
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chose a division, as opposed to when they believe that a human partner did so (Blount, 
1995; Knoch et al, 2006).  Given that both situations involving free rewards and those 
involving effort are prevalent in the real world, it seems essential to an understanding 
humans’ responses to inequity to better distinguish the differences in response they 
generate. Aside from providing an interesting new line of research in human populations, 
this distinction is one that is mostly absent from the models of inequity common in the 
literature.  Including this distinction, and the differences in response resulting from it, 
may even affect existing theories on reactions to inequity in humans (Khalil, in press-b). 
1.4.4  The evolution of the sense of justice 
The previous section demonstrates that primate experiments reveal a behavioral 
response to inequity, supporting the hypothesis that behavior relevant to at least one 
moral behavior, the sense of justice, does exist in species other than humans. Several 
species of nonhuman primates (and several non-primates) respond negatively to earning 
less preferred rewards than a social partner.  Some species even respond behaviorally to 
rectify inequity which affects a partner, although the context in which this occurs is still 
not clear.  These behaviors may have emerged through either convergence or homology 
(see Introduction, Section 1.2).  Evidence from capuchins, chimpanzees, and humans, 
even with the addition of dogs, is not sufficient to distinguish between these possibilities 
since all three species share in common traits (cooperation, gregariousness) which have 
been linked to negative responses to inequity.  In particular, cooperation has previously 
been linked to the inequity response (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Brosnan et al, 2006), 
meaning it that it may be the critical environmental factor that led to selection for the 
behavior.  Regardless of whether these behaviors emerged once in a common ancestor 
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and represent an evolutionary homology or arose in parallel several different times, we 
can use the comparative approach to track the evolutionary trajectory of this response.  In 
this way we can understand more about the features which are important for the inequity 
response. 
The inequity response likely evolved in four steps (Brosnan, 2006a). Note that 
although these steps represent a process of cumulative behavioral complexity, at each 
step there is some benefit to the individual.  Moreover, not all species will exhibit all of 
the steps.  Thus, when looking for sensitivity to inequity it is important to look for any of 
the stages of the behavior, and not focus on solely the more complex behaviors. 
A first necessary step is to notice inequity.  This may have been a byproduct of 
any other behavior that selected individuals to pay attention to conspecifics, such as 
social learning (which is present in many species).  In and of itself, noticing inequity is 
not beneficial (at least for an inequity response, although it is clearly beneficial in other 
situations).  However, if these individuals took this to the next step and began to respond 
negatively to inequity, there is a benefit.  Even a non-targeted negative response to 
inequity may provide this benefit.  If individuals begin to react negatively to individuals 
who treat them inequitably, this may lead them to cease interactions with those partners 
and seek out others.  By chance alone it is likely that some new partners will behave more 
equitably. In this case, they have benefited, even if they do not recognize why they had 
the negative response or that their change in behavior has provided a benefit.  This would 
enhance the individual’s fitness, resulting in positive selection for the behavior.  Most of 
the evidence for inequity responses is likely at this stage: individuals respond negatively 
to inequity and, based on the one test in which subjects could choose whether or not to 
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participate (Brosnan et al, 2006), seem to cease interacting with partners who are not 
equitable.  In the third step, individuals understand that they are receiving less and 
actively take steps to rectify inequity. This is likely the stage at which humans operate, 
for example, by punishing individuals who do not play fairly (Fehr & Gächter, 2002).  
Thus far, only scant evidence exists that nonhumans show this reaction.  For example, if 
it turns out that capuchins are punishing social partners who do not share by ceasing to 
cooperate (Brosnan et al, 2006), this would be an example of this stage of the response. 
 The final stage of the response was likely responding when advantaged, or 
rectifying inequity in others.  Although advantageous inequity responses are also 
explicable via individual natural selection, disadvantageous inequity responses are more 
straightforward as there is a more immediate benefit to the partner.  In the case of 
advantageous inequity, however, individuals must actually act against their own short-
term self interest, giving up rewards to benefit partners.  However, despite the short term 
cost, this behavior may increase long-term benefit (see section 1.4.1).  Responses which 
assist another individual are seen in nonhuman primates, as discussed above (section 
1.4.2).  However, these behaviors do not appear to be as easy to elicit in non-human 
primates as in humans.  One possibility, of course, is that we have not designed tests that 
do a good job of exploring these other species’ capacities.  Another possibility is that 
human prosocial responses are more fully developed than those of other species.  This 
may be indication that prosocial behaviors (e.g., strong reciprocity; Gintis, 2000) were 
particularly important in humans’ evolution. 
1.5 Conclusion 
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 Moral emotions are not the only area of economics in which studies from non-
human species are being used to inform our understanding of human behavior.  For 
instance, other species show behavior which is in line with Prospect Theory (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979) in the same ways as do humans (Brosnan et al., 2007; Chen et al., 
2006; Lakshminarayanan et al., 2008).  This indicates that humans’ ‘irrational’ behaviors 
(Ariely, 2008) are not unique, and that these behaviors were likely beneficial at some 
point in our evolutionary history (Jones and Brosnan, 2008).  For example, constraints 
such as the lack of language would have inhibited the growth of institutions that could 
protect against losses (Brosnan et al., 2008).   
 With respect to moral behaviors and emotions, by understanding precursors, such 
as the inequity response, we have a better understanding of the evolution of moral 
behaviors. These behaviors may not be identical to those of humans, but in examining 
them we see the connection between our behaviors and those of other species. Far from 
being simply an academic exercise, the study of these behaviors helps to clarify how our 
own behaviors evolved and the constraints which may be encountered. This line of 
thinking is not new; Charles Darwin clearly saw continuity between the species, and, 
though he was not a biologist, Adam Smith did as well. Perhaps in the future this 
evolutionary approach to human behavior will once again span disciplinary boundaries.  
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